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Abstract 
This paper reviews the literature on the performance of commonly found social 
safety net programs in developing countries.  The evidence suggests that universal food 
subsidies have very limited potential for redistributing income.  While targeted food 
subsidies have greater potential, this can only be realized when adequate attention is 
given to the design and implementation, as well as to the social and political factors 
influencing the adoption, of these programs.  Although well-designed public works 
programs have impressive targeting performance, they have large non-wage costs; thus, 
to be cost-effective, they need to produce outputs that are especially beneficial to poor 
households.  Social funds, which emphasize both community involvement and asset 
creation, have been cost-effective, but they are difficult to target to extremely poor 
households.  Traditional public works programs are particularly attractive for addressing 
vulnerability, but they require flexibility regarding choice of output.  Targeted human-
capital subsidies appear to have great potential for addressing extreme poverty; but again, 
their design needs to reflect the human capital profile of countries and the administrative 
capability of the government. 
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1.  Introduction 
For more than a decade the performance of developing countries in tackling 
poverty has been mixed.  In some regions it has been dismal: the number of people living 
in poverty in South Asia has increased by about 10 percent, and the prevalence of 
malnutrition has remained substantially higher than in other developing countries.  Over 
the same period, the poverty rate has increased slightly in Sub-Saharan Africa￿to around 
48 percent￿and the prevalence of malnutrition has also increased.  It is clear, therefore, 
that a business-as-usual approach is inadequate.  A more effective poverty alleviation 
strategy is urgently required. 
While there is an emerging consensus that renewed broad-based economic growth 
is a necessary condition for alleviating poverty within an acceptable time frame, in 
isolation it is insufficient (World Bank 1997; Sahn and Stifel 2000; Haddad et al. 2003).  
In particular, it is now widely accepted that effective social safety nets are also important 
components of any comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy.  In fact, for many of the 
world￿s poor, such programs are the only hope of a life free from chronic poverty, 
malnutrition, and disease.  The importance of these transfers is magnified as informal 
private networks￿such as those based on kinship or community￿become less effective 
with increased economic development.
1 
Social safety net programs are defined here as programs whose primary objective 
is to directly reduce poverty.  However, as the nature and causes of poverty differ, so, 
too, do the nature and design of social safety net programs.  For example, it is common to 
distinguish between chronic (persistent) and transient (temporary) poverty.  The former 
refers to households that remain in poverty over time due to their low asset base.  The 
                                                 
1 The development process is often characterized as involving a simultaneous increase in idiosyncratic risk 
and a breakdown of the informal relationships that provide social assistance and insurance functions.  In the 
words of Rodrick (2000, p. 19), ￿Social insurance legitimizes a market economy because it renders it 
compatible with stability and social cohesion.￿  Traditional systems are often less effective because of 
population pressures, incentive problems, and covariate risks.  Thus, an effective social security system 
must go beyond an exclusive reliance on traditional institutions￿but not neglect the contribution that such 
institutions can make (Platteau 1991). 2 
latter refers to households that fall into poverty due to their inability to sufficiently 
protect themselves from shocks, whether anticipated or not.  Consistent with this 
classification, DrŁze and Sen (1991) identified two distinct but interrelated roles for 
public policy.  First is the promotional role, the elimination of chronic poverty by 
enhancing the asset base of households. Second is the protective role, the prevention of 
households vulnerable to adverse shocks from entering into a spiral of poverty.
2 
However, as widely practiced, existing social safety nets are perceived to have a 
number of shortcomings that substantially reduce their effectiveness.
3  First, they often 
fail to reach the intended target group￿the poorest households.  Second, they are made 
up of a myriad of small, uncoordinated, and duplicative transfer programs.  Third, a 
combination of operational inefficiencies and corruption results in an unnecessarily high 
cost of transferring resources to households.  Fourth, even when the transfers do reach 
intended beneficiaries, they fail to generate a sustained decrease in poverty independent 
of the transfers.  Fifth, the transfers are often too small, and program coverage too low, to 
have any noticeable effect on overall poverty. 
This paper reviews issues that need to be considered in designing cost-effective 
social safety nets, with particular reference to the above shortcomings and a primary, 
though not exclusive, focus on their roles as social assistance for the poorest households.
4  
Section 2 sets out a general analytical framework.  Sections 3￿5 provide a more detailed 
discussion of three broad categories of programs.
5  First are food subsidies, both 
universal and administratively targeted.  Second are public works schemes that employ 
the poor on projects that maintain or create community assets.  Although such schemes 
involve the construction of infrastructure that can enhance future incomes, it is usually 
                                                 
2 See Morduch (1994) and Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) for related discussions. 
3 For further discussion of some of the issues set out below, see Ahmad et al. (1991); Haddad and Zeller 
(1997); Subbarao et al. (1997); Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002); Smith and Subbarao (2003); and 
Ravallion (2003). 
4 Various papers on the World Bank social safety net website discuss many of the issues set out below in 
greater detail:  <www1.worldbank.org/sp/safetynets/>. 
5 The Appendix Table summarizes the relative pros and cons of the various program types. 3 
the transfer component (wages) that is emphasized, especially in Asia and Africa.  More 
recently, social fund projects have become popular, especially in Latin America.  These 
typically differ from public works in that they put more emphasis on asset creation.  They 
also tend to be demand driven, i.e., communities are involved in identifying, designing, 
and implementing projects.  Third are targeted human capital subsidies (transfers 
conditioned on children of the poor attending school or health clinics), which have 
recently become popular, again especially in Latin America. 
Although this set of programs by no means covers the myriad types of social 
safety net systems found worldwide, it does account for a very large proportion of total 
social safety net expenditures, and many of the issues raised here apply equally to other 
expenditures (such as pure cash transfer programs).
6 
2.  An Analytical Framework 
This section provides a simple, yet general, evaluation framework in which the 
welfare impact of alternative policy interventions may be understood and compared, 
particularly from the perspective of their distributional impact.  It starts with a very 
simple model comprising two groups￿households and government￿that incorporates 
the various policy instruments under consideration.
7  Although the model can be adapted 
to incorporate a wider set of second-best economic structures (DrŁze and Stern 1987), in 
order not to add notational complexity and maintain accessibility, we confine ourselves to 
this simpler version.  (However, where relevant, we discuss how the model can be 
extended to address various issues.)  After a discussion of the model, this section focuses 
on the various safety net components and the derivation of analytical expressions to 
capture their more important welfare impacts. 
                                                 
6 According to Tabor (2003), pure cash transfer programs (e.g., child benefit and noncontributory pensions) 
are very rare in developing countries, especially low-income developing countries, and tend to serve more a 
social insurance role rather than a social assistance role. 
7 The model is a special case of the more general model presented in DrŁze and Stern (1987), which, in 
turn, draws on Guesnerie (1979); see, also, the seminal paper of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). 4 
A Simple Model 
Households are assumed to maximize utility, U, subject to a budget constraint: 
 Max  U(x, xtr) s.t  qx + qrxtr ￿ wplp = (qr ￿ pr)xr + m, 
where 
x =  consumption of nonrationed private goods (with a household￿s labor 
supply in the private sector, lm entering as a negative number), 
xtr  =  is total consumption of a rationed good (i.e., rationed consumption, 
xr, plus market consumption, xm), 
q and qr  =  are their respective market prices, 
pr  =  is the ration price, 
lp  =  is the labor supplied to a public works program at wage wp, and 
m   =  is cash transfers from the government.
8 
The budget constraint captures the fact that net expenditures on private goods (i.e., net of 
earnings from the labor market) plus rationed goods, minus wage earnings from public 
works employment, must equal the sum of food subsidies and cash transfers from the 
government.  Employment on a public works program is determined (or rationed) by the 
government, and one can think of total labor supply as fixed with 
  lm + lp = l, 
where l is total labor supply and lm is labor supply to the market.  By writing the budget 
constraint this way, we are implicitly assuming that the rationed good is also available on 
the free market, and ration levels are inframarginal (i.e., less than household￿s total 
consumption) or resale is possible. 
Let p denote producer prices, so that 
  t = (q ￿ p) 
                                                 
8 Vectors are indicated in lower-case bold type. 5 
can be interpreted as commodity taxes (negative if subsidies), and qr as the price at which 
the government procures the rationed good from the free market.  Then the government 
budget constraint is given by 
  R = (q ￿ p)x ￿ (qr ￿ pr)xr ￿ wplp ￿ ∑hm
h . 
The objective of the ￿social planner￿ is then to optimize social welfare subject to 
households￿ maximization of their utilities and to the government budget constraint.  The 
social welfare function is modeled in the standard way through a Bergson-Samuelson 
function as follows: 
  W = W (..., V
h(q, qr, pr, xr, lp, wp, m
h),...), 
where V(.) is the indirect utility function of households (denoted h).  The Lagrangean for 
the planner￿s problem can be written as: 
  L ≡ W (..., V
h(q, qr, pr, xr, lp, wp, m
h),...) + λ R (*) 
where λ is interpreted as the social cost of raising extra government revenue, which will 
depend on how expenditures are financed and the associated equity and efficiency 
impacts.  Without loss of generalization, this parameter can be normalized at unity. 
The government thus has a number of policy instruments that it can use to transfer 
resources to households: 
1.  Cash transfers.  Transfer of cash to a target group of households (captured by 
dm
h) using, for example, geographic or household targeting based on some means 
test. 
2.  Food subsidies.  Subsidization of a commodity i consumed disproportionately by 
the poor (usually food) by keeping its market price below the producer (or world) 
price, i.e., qi < pi. 6 
3.  Subsidized rations.  Provision of a fixed supply of a given commodity (usually 
food) through ration shops at subsidized prices, i.e., supplying xr at pr < qr.  
Ration levels and/or prices can be differentiated across households, in which case 
the ration levels and prices will have an appropriate superscript.  For convenience, 
we assume that ration levels are inframarginal so that total consumption of the 
rationed good (i.e., market purchases plus ration levels) exceeds ration levels. 
4.  Public goods.  One can similarly think of xr as the public supply of a good not 
available on the free market so that xtr = xr.  In this case, one can interpret qr as the 
cost of producing the good (which then does not enter into the household budget 
constraint) and pr as the price charged to households. 
5.  Public works.  Provision of employment on public works schemes that produce a 
private good or a rationed public good not available on the free market.  The 
supply of the public good is treated as above. 
The welfare impact of each policy instrument can be derived by simply 
differentiating (*) with respect to the relevant policy parameter.  This provides a set of 
analytical equations that will help structure the review of the empirical evidence.  To save 
space, we provide a detailed example of the derivation of such an equation only for the 
case of cash transfer programs. 
Cash Transfers and Welfare Weights 
The welfare impact of cash transfers is derived by differentiating (*) with respect 
to m
h to get 


















λ β , (1) 
where β
h is the social valuation of extra income to household h (typically referred to as 
￿welfare weights￿) and dm
h is the cash transfer to the household; the vector dm can be 
interpreted as a transfer program.  The first term captures the welfare impact of the 7 
transfers to households; the second captures the implications of the transfers for 
government revenue, including the second-round revenue effects arising from the fact 
that these transfers change the consumption levels of taxed (or subsidized) commodities. 
A general equilibrium benefit-cost statistic for any cash transfer program can be 
constructed by dividing the first term in equation (1) by the second.  However, most of 
this discussion focuses on the partial equilibrium statistic.  The partial equilibrium 
benefit-cost statistic is derived by ignoring the indirect effects on revenue due to demand 
changes so that the revenue cost of the transfer program is captured by the sum of 
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where the denominator is the total transfer budget for the program, and θm
h is the share of 
each household in the total transfer budget (Coady and Skoufias 2001).  In general, the 
welfare weights, β, are assumed to decrease continuously with income.  However, for our 
purposes, it suffices to use a more restrictive version, which attributes a welfare weight of 
unity to households classified as ￿poor￿ and zero to the ￿nonpoor.￿  Using this 
formulation of welfare weights, the benefit-cost statistic can be interpreted as the share of 
total transfers going to poor households.  Therefore, the better the transfers are targeted at 
poor households, the higher the welfare impact. 
This statistic can easily be adapted to allow for administrative costs associated 
with transfer programs by including such costs in the denominator to get 
  .
cp
mm t λ θθ = , 
where θt is the share of transfers in the total program budget (or 1 minus the share of 
administrative costs).  Therefore, ceteris paribus, programs with relatively high 
administrative costs will have a low θt and relatively low benefit-cost ratios.  (Note that 
higher administrative costs may be associated with a higher social value of transfers, e.g., 8 
when higher administrative costs are associated with the use of administrative targeting 
methods that result in a higher proportion of the budget going to poor households.)  The 
concept of costs can also be broadened to include other costs (e.g., those related to 
corruption or distribution).  Similarly, private costs, such as income forgone or other 
private costs incurred in taking up the program, can be incorporated through the 
numerator by appropriately reducing the transfer to each household. 
In equation (1) above, the only distortion in the economy is the existence of 
commodity taxation (including leisure).  Cash transfers lead to a change in consumption 
of commodities with varying tax and subsidy rates.  This, in turn, leads to a change in 
government revenue, which is valued using the social value of government revenue.  In 
other words, in a distorted economy, income effects have efficiency implications through 
the impact on consumption patterns, which were originally distorted by commodity taxes.  
Therefore, some other important ￿indirect welfare effects￿ are ignored in the above 
specification.  For example, the eligibility rules for receipt of transfers may incentivize 
households to decrease their income (or devote resources to ￿hiding￿ income) to qualify 
for the program.  This decreases the welfare impact of the program, both through the 
imperfect targeting that results when income cannot be perfectly observed, as well as 
through the inefficient reallocation of labor by households.  Note that the latter is 
somewhat different to the reallocation of labor because of income effects.  In the absence 
of any initial distortions (including commodity taxes), such reallocations have no indirect 
welfare impacts, since households were already optimizing.  However, if one focuses 
more narrowly on income (i.e., ignoring ￿leisure￿), as is the case with poverty indices, 
such perverse income effects will show up as decreasing welfare. 
Another indirect welfare impact often identified in the literature relates to public 
transfers ￿crowding out￿ private transfers (or informal safety net mechanisms), so that the 
net income increase for program beneficiaries is less than the program transfer.  The net 
welfare impact of such responses will depend on the distribution pattern of informal 
transfers.  If poor households receive private transfers mainly from other poor 
households, then the net welfare impact of crowding out is minimal.  However, if these 9 
are financed by rich households (i.e., those with much lower welfare weights relative to 
the poor), then they can have a substantial negative impact on welfare. 
There is also an emerging theoretical literature that focuses on the dynamic effects 
of cash transfers when credit and insurance markets are imperfect (see Ravallion 2003 for 
a review).  In the presence of such market imperfections, cash transfers can have 
important indirect welfare impacts.  If the poor face imperfect credit markets in the sense 
that they face a private cost of capital higher than the true opportunity cost of credit, then 
redistributing income to poor households will increase their investment levels and thus 
their future consumption.  Similarly, if the poor are unable to insure against risk, they will 
tend to underinvest in risky but higher return projects.  Public transfers provide them with 
an additional source of certain income and thus encourage them to take on more of these 
projects. 
Universal Food Subsidies 
As above, one can construct a partial equilibrium benefit-cost statistic for 
universal food subsidies as: 
















λ , (3) 
where θi
h is the share of household h in the total consumption of commodity i, which 
captures the household￿s share in the total subsidy bill, and θi
p is the aggregate share of 
poor households.  The greater the share of the poor in total consumption of i, the greater 
their share of the total subsidy bill and thus the higher the benefit-cost ratio.  From this 
perspective, one should subsidize commodities consumed disproportionately by the poor. 
The general equilibrium benefit-cost statistic can be derived as before, by dividing 
by an appropriate revenue elasticity to get 
 /
Gp
ii i E λθ = . 10 
The term Ei is a revenue elasticity with respect to the price of good i and depends on 
demand responses.  It thus captures the efficiency costs associated with taxes and 
subsidies.  In the case of taxes, the more elastic the demand, the lower Ei and thus the 
greater the welfare decrease due to the tax.  In the case of subsidies, the more elastic the 
demand, the higher Ei, and thus the lower the welfare increase due to subsidies.  This 
suggests that efficiency costs are lower if one manipulates the prices of commodities with 
low-price elasticities. 
Subsidized Rationed Foods 
The welfare impact of increasing the ration subsidy is derived by differentiating 
(*) with respect to pr to get 














λ  (4) 
where a fixed ration level across all households is assumed, θp
h is the share of total 
expenditures on this reform received by each household, and θp
p is the share of the 
subsidy received by poor households.  Again, the welfare impact of this reform is higher 
if rations are targeted at poor households.  Administrative costs can also be incorporated 
by multiplying by θt, the share of ration subsidies in the total budget. 
Public Works 
Consider first the case where the government employs labor at a fixed wage to 
produce a private good such as xp, which, for the present, can be thought of as being sold 
at qp on the open market.  The direct effect on government revenue is 
  dR = qpxp ￿ cf ￿ wplpxp, 
where 11 
qpxp  =  the revenue generated from the output, 
cf  =  the fixed cost incurred to produce the output (e.g., capital equipment 
and administrative costs in setting up the project), 
wp  =  the wage paid, 
lp  =  quantity of labor used per unit of output, and 
wplpxp  =  the wage bill. 
The benefits to the household come from employment on the public works at a wage 
higher than their market wage (or reservation wage if the work on nonmarket activities); 
only those with wm < wp will take up the employment opportunity, where wm is the market 
wage.  The social valuation of these gains is β(wp ￿ wm)lpxp. 
The total impact on welfare is again derived by differentiation of (*) with respect 
to xp, setting dxp = 1 for convenience, to get 















l w c q l w w
m
x
t l w w dx
x
W





∂ ∑∑ ∑ λ β . 
















If we ignore the output benefits, assume that forgone income is a fixed proportion 
(α) of the public wage, and set β = (0,1) for (nonpoor, poor) respectively, then 
  λp = (1 - α)θwθp, (6) 12 
where θw is the share of wage payments in total program costs (i.e., wage plus non-wage 
costs) and θp is the share of total wage payments received by poor households.
9  The 
welfare gains per unit expenditure are therefore greater the higher the proportion of the 
labor employed is from poor households, the greater the gap between project and market 
wages (or, more generally, forgone earnings), and the greater the share of wages in total 
program costs. 
If, instead, the output xr is a public good made available to households at pr 
(possibly zero), then the value of the output is taken out of the denominator and placed in 
the numerator with the output valued at household willingness to pay 
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where H is the number of households receiving, and being charged for, the public good.  
The welfare impact of the project is now greater if the benefits of the output (i.e., the 
consumer surplus calculated as the difference between WTP and the price charged) 
accrue disproportionately to the poor either in terms of current or future welfare. 
Note that when we ignore the income benefits from the employment side (e.g., 
because workers are paid their social opportunity costs), we get an expression for the 












λ , (8) 
where WTP
h is the household￿s willingness to pay for the extra public supply, pr 
is the charge for this supply, and c is the unit cost of supply.  One can think of human 
                                                 
9 Note that the total welfare impact could have been derived by focusing solely on the ￿shadow profits￿ 
generated by the project, where inputs and outputs are valued at shadow prices and labor is valued using the 
formula for the Little-Mirrlees shadow wage rate (swr), i.e., swr = wp ￿ β(wp ￿ wm).  See Little and Mirrlees 
(1974) and DrŁze and Stern (1987) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.  Equation (6) is 
essentially the decomposition presented in Ravallion (1999). 13 
capital subsidies as reducing the private cost (pr) of access by the amount of the subsidy 
thus inducing extra demand. 
3.  Food Subsidies 
This section begins with a discussion of the distributional impact of universal 
food subsidies, subsidized rationed food, and food stamps.
10  All of these involve 
transfers that are essentially conditioned on the households consuming subsidized food.  
A universal food subsidy involves the government fixing the food price below market (or 
world) price, with households free to consume as much as they wish.  Subsidized rationed 
food involves the sale of a fixed amount of food at a subsidized price through ration 
shops.  Food stamps involve the transfer of a coupon, which can be exchanged in private 
outlets for certain foods at market prices up to the face value of the coupon. 
The objectives of such subsidies have varied, but typically they include increasing 
the purchasing power of low-income households, reducing calorie and micronutrient 
deficiencies, maintaining low urban wages, and ensuring social and political stability.  
The focus here is primarily on their distributional power as measured by their ability to 
get a large amount of a poverty alleviation budget into the hands of the poorest 
households. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, universal food subsidies were a major component of 
poverty alleviation strategies in many developing countries.  Countries such as 
Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia introduced universal food 
subsidies in the early 1950s.  These typically took the form of a combination of implicit 
and explicit taxes on agricultural outputs (e.g., import subsidies, export taxes, and low 
domestically controlled procurement prices).  Two events highlighted the shortcomings 
of such an approach.  First was the large increase in world food prices in the mid 1970s.  
The cost of subsidies became enormous, leading governments to try to absorb the higher 
                                                 
10 See Alderman (2002) for detailed information and discussion of many of the programs and issues 
discussed below. 14 
costs through higher public expenditures and budget deficits.  In the early 1980s, the cost 
of such programs was as high as 4￿5 percent of GDP in Sri Lanka and Tunisia.  Second, 
the stabilization and structural adjustment programs introduced in the early 1980s 
emphasized the need to cut back on ineffective government expenditures to reduce 
budget deficits and inflation.  Universal food subsidies were seen as inefficient because a 
large proportion of the benefits leaked to the nonpoor, and the price manipulations 
inherent in such an approach were often highly distortionary. 
One of the first substantial pieces of research into the role and implications of 
food subsidies was Pinstrup-Andersen (1988), which summarized the findings of the 
early research on South Asia (in the late 1970s) and Egypt (in the early 1980s).  This 
research highlighted the trade-offs between the distributional implications of universal 
food subsidies and the efficiency costs of the price distortions imposed to finance such 
transfers.  While recognizing the important role played by food subsidies in increasing 
food consumption and nutrition in poor households, it also emphasized the need to 
minimize any adverse impact on agricultural production.  It also noted that budgetary 
pressures on public expenditures necessitated a greater effort to target these subsidies to 
the poor.
11  This approach was consistent with the emphasis of structural adjustment 
programs in the early 1980s. 
The previous section showed that the general equilibrium welfare impact of 
universal food subsidies can be derived as 
  λi = θi
p / Ei, 
where θi
p is the share of transfers going to poor households (which equals their share in 
the total consumption of i) and captures the equity (or distributional) implications of the 
tax or subsidy.  Ei is the elasticity of revenue with respect to this tax and captures the 
efficiency implications.  For a tax, the welfare impact on households is negative, and 
Ei < 1 when demand decreases with the tax, thus magnifying the welfare losses.  For a 
                                                 
11 For a detailed discussion of the adverse effects on agricultural production, see Mellor and Ahmed (1988). 15 
subsidy, the welfare impact on households is positive, and Ei > 1 when demand increases 
with the subsidy, thus reducing welfare gains.  Crudely speaking, one can think of Ei 
being closer to unity when efficiency costs are small. 
The standard result in the empirical literature relates to the trade-off between 
equity and efficiency when setting tax and subsidy rates.  Efficiency concerns require 
taxes to be inversely related to commodity price elasticities (the so-called inverse 
elasticity rule).  But, since elasticities are typically relatively low for necessities such as 
food, which account for a relatively substantial proportion of the expenditures of the 
poor, efficient taxes are highly inequitable.  However, the corollary of this is that such 
commodities are good candidates for transfers through universal subsidies since they are 
consumed disproportionately by low-income households and their low price elasticities 
imply low efficiency costs. 
In the context of developing countries, where many rural households are both 
consumers and producers of food, the ￿inverse elasticity rule￿ relates to net trade 
elasticities (i.e., the elasticity of marketed surplus).
12  Many households consume a 
substantial proportion of their food production on-farm so that net market trades are often 
only a small proportion of their total consumption or production.  For example, using the 
price controls existing in Pakistan in the mid 1970s, Coady (1997) showed that fixing 
producer prices for such commodities as wheat below world prices can be a very 
powerful redistributional policy instrument, since the poorest households are net 
consumers and the richer households are net producers, implying a high θi
p.  Therefore, 
low prices are essentially a subsidy to the poor financed by the rich.  However, the large 
proportion of consumption out of own production means that net trade elasticities are 
very high (even if consumption or production elasticities are relatively low) so that 
                                                 
12 For more detailed discussion, see Ahmad and Stern (1984, 1991), DrŁze and Stern (1987), and Newbery 
and Stern (1987). 16 
producer price controls are highly inefficient.  Thus, the standard trade-off between 
equity and efficiency is magnified in developing countries.
13 
From the perspective of structural adjustment, the required policy response was 
seen as obvious: price liberalization implied shifting the burden of transfers to the public 
sector (i.e., away from agricultural producers) by financing these out of general revenues, 
while cost-effectiveness required targeting public expenditures more directly at the poor.  
One option is for the government to procure food at market prices and make it universally 
available at a subsidized price, thus avoiding production inefficiencies and incurring only 
the inefficiencies associated with distorted consumption patterns.  This essentially 
involves the targeting of universal subsidies using ￿self- selection￿ targeting methods, 
i.e., selecting commodities consumed disproportionately by the poor (i.e., inferior goods 
or those with low income elasticities).
14 
However, even when the right commodity is selected, universal food subsidies are 
rarely progressive and are often slightly regressive.  This partly reflects the fact that it is 
difficult to identify commodities that are inferior and whose price can also be easily 
manipulated by government controls.  In addition, the amount of the transfer is limited by 
the commodity￿s budget share (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988; Alderman and Lindert 1998), 
and the associated inefficiencies tend to increase with the size of the subsidy.  Expanding 
the set of commodities that are subsidized in order to facilitate larger transfers will 
usually involve a large trade-off in terms of lower progressivity.  Keeping the transfer 
budget constant, spreading subsidies across a number of commodities should help to 
lower the efficiency cost of price distortions.  But including more commodities may also 
substantially increase administrative costs. 
                                                 
13 Schiff and Valdes (1992) provided an in-depth analysis of the economic effects of agricultural price 
manipulations in 18 developing countries for the period 1960￿85.  Their analysis highlighted the large 
transfer of resources out of agriculture, with indirect taxes on agriculture standing at around 22 percent, and 
the fact that ￿the modernization of agriculture was being sacrificed at the alter of industrialization￿ 
(foreword by T.W. Schultz).  The importance of political economy in shaping the form this extractive 
approach took, and in determining the possibilities for reform, was discussed in Krueger (1992). 
14 See Grosh (1994) and Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002) for a discussion of alternative targeting 
methods and a review of targeting practice. 17 
According to the review by Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002 [henceforth 
CGH]), which focuses on the share of transfers going to the poor (i.e., θi
p), universal food 
subsidies are rarely progressive.  Only 3 of 15 programs for which they had evidence on 
targeting performance were progressive.  The median targeting performance was 
regressive, with the poorest 30 percent of the population receiving only 29 percent of 
total transfers.  In other words, for every $1.00 transferred to the poor through universal 
subsidies (i.e., the inverse of θi
p), the government spent $3.40.  Incorporating 
administrative or economic efficiency costs would obviously increase this cost even 
further.  For these reasons, universal subsidies are typically seen as short-term solutions 
until better targeting mechanisms are developed. 
Alternatively, one can use finer administrative targeting methods, which are 
potentially more distributionally powerful and more efficient.  The welfare impact of 
these was derived above as 
 
p
ip t λ θθ = , 
i.e., the share of the rationed food going to poor households multiplied by the share of 
subsidies in the total program cost.  There are many examples of attempts to target 
subsidized food to poor households.  First is universal access to subsidized food sold 
through a public distribution center (or designated private outlet) on a first-come, first-
served basis.  Outlets are often located in poorer areas, open at inconvenient times, and 
can require lengthy queuing times, with individuals often queuing well before opening 
time.  The sum of cash plus time costs effectively clears the market.  Although access is, 
in principle, universal, it is argued that the fact that nonpoor households have higher 
opportunity costs of time, and there may be some social stigma costs, leads them to have 
lower take-up rates.  As with universal subsidies sold through private markets, this is a 
form of targeting through self-selection.  Second is universal access to a fixed quantity 
ration of food sold at subsidized prices through public ration shops, which may also be 
located in poor areas, only open at inconvenient times, and often requiring lengthy 18 
queuing times.  Third are ration cards targeted to poor households using means tests or 
other forms of administrative targeting.  Targeted households receive a ration card that 
entitles them to a certain amount of food at a subsidized price.  The progressiveness of 
transfers depends on how well they are targeted, as well as on the time and stigma costs 
as above.  Fourth are rationed food stamps￿a variation of ration cards, the difference 
being that they usually entitle the holder to a fixed amount of food denominated in money 
(as opposed to quantity) units free of charge and can be redeemed at private outlets or 
even sold to others.  Private traders can then redeem them at face value at a bank.  Again, 
the progressiveness of such transfers depends on how well they are targeted.  A number 
of countries switched from universal to targeted food subsidies during the 1980s and 
1990s, including Bangladesh, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Mexico, Tunisia, and Sri 
Lanka. 
Providing universal access to unrestricted consumption of subsidized food has 
both income and substitution effects.  However, if ration transfers are fixed below 
existing household consumption levels, or if resale is possible at low transaction costs, 
then these subsidized rations are approximately equivalent to cash transfers and thus only 
have income effects.  Thus, from the perspective of income poverty, (equivalent) cash 
transfers are always superior to food subsidies, since the latter typically have an 
additional inefficiency (i.e., a deadweight loss) associated with their substitution effects.  
In addition, if the transaction costs of distributing food (including theft, etc.) are higher 
than for the distribution cash, i.e., if food has a relatively high θt above, then cash 
transfers may be preferred.  There is some evidence, especially in South Asia, that this 
may be the case (Ahmed et al. 2001; Ahmed and del Ninno 2001). 
There are many examples of targeted ration systems in developing countries.  For 
example, the public distribution system in India has a long history (Ahluwalia 1993; 
Radhakrishna and Subbarao 1997).  However, the performance of these systems has not 
always been great, typically because of a combination of a lack of political will, 
corruption, and the high costs associated with distributing food.  The potential impact on 19 
poverty has often been affected by a combination of poor targeting and program design.  
For example, liquidity-constrained poor households have often not been able to take up 
their full ration entitlements (Alderman and von Braun 1984; Rao 2000).  The CGH 
review found that the targeting performance across 19 programs varied widely.  The 
median targeting performance was consistent with the poorest 30 percent of the 
population receiving only 37 percent of total transfers.  In other words, the government 
spent around $2.67 for every $1.00 transferred to the poor.  This is also, of course, a 
lower bound, since we are ignoring other costs, such as administrative costs and theft.  
But targeting performance also varied both spatially and by commodity.  For example, in 
rural programs in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, the poor received 
49 and 41 percent of total transfers, respectively.  The equivalent percentages for their 
urban programs were 33 and 31 percent, respectively (Dutta and Ramaswami 2001).  
Over all of India, the poorest 30 percent received 47 percent of the total jowar subsidies, 
but only 30 percent of the total wheat subsidies (Jha 1992).  This variation helps highlight 
the fact that detailed design and implementation issues are extremely important in 
determining targeting performance. 
Many of the practical difficulties associated with reforming ration systems were 
discussed in Pinstrup-Andersen (1988).
15  The above evidence suggests that better 
targeting of rationed food subsidies and better implementation and monitoring so as to 
avoid losses due to distribution losses and corruption can substantially improve the cost-
effectiveness of such ration schemes.  To the extent that such inefficiencies are inherently 
linked to the use of food as a benefit, there may be a strong argument for switching to 
cash transfers.
16  But there is a real need for more rigorous empirical evidence on this 
issue.  It is also widely agreed that the targeting method chosen must be appropriate 
within the existing social, political, and administrative context of the country.  The 
                                                 
15 See, also, Ahmed et al. (2001) for details on how an operational proxy means targeting approach was 
developed in Egypt and the political factors determining its design. 
16 See Alderman (2002, Annex 1) for a summary of studies on the extent of leakage from food subsidy 
programs. 20 
existence or reform of food subsidy systems affects a number of competing groups in 
society, and their relative power often determines outcomes (Bienen and Gersowitz 1986; 
Alderman 1988; Tuck and Lindert 1998; Adams 1988, 2000).  However, informing the 
public of the costs and benefits of these programs seems to play a crucial role in 
determining their acceptance of these reforms and in neutralizing small but vocal power 
groups.  Similarly, it is usually easier to reform subsidy systems when market food prices 
are low or when vocal groups are otherwise distracted. 
4.  Public Works 
One of the common criticisms of food subsidies and other cash or in-kind 
transfers is that their effectiveness persists only as long as the transfers themselves 
persist.
17  Such a strategy is typically seen as undesirable, both in terms of the 
dependency culture it creates but also the pressure it puts on public finances.  Longer-
term measures that address persistent poverty require policies that help poor households 
build up their asset base to promote their participation in the development process, i.e., a 
more ￿developmental￿ approach.  Public works provide one such alternative, since they 
can have both features, with wage transfers addressing short-term poverty and the output 
from these projects potentially enhancing the poor￿s asset base and thus helping alleviate 
poverty in the medium to long run.
18  Public works are also often perceived as an 
effective policy instrument for addressing vulnerability to poverty, especially when they 
allow households to self-select into existing programs in times of hardship or where 
programs are activated in areas subject to economic shocks.  But some shocks (e.g., 
illness or disability) may preclude some households from participating in such programs 
so that other interventions are also required. 
                                                 
17 This obviously ignores the potential for dynamic effects in the presence of credit and insurance market 
failures (see Ravallion 2003). 
18 See Subbarao (2003) for more detailed information on and discussion of many of the programs and 
issues discussed below. 21 
Public works programs have been around for decades.  They constituted an 
important component of India￿s famine relief during the nineteenth century, and they 
have existed in South Africa and Bangladesh since the nineteenth century and the 1960s, 
respectively.  But they became more widespread and more focused in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, especially in Asia and Africa.  Such programs have often accounted for a 
substantial proportion of employment generated nationally, e.g., 21 percent of the labor 
force in Botswana in 1985￿86, and 13 percent in Chile in 1983.  The recent emphasis on 
￿social funds￿ is part of this trend, but these programs differ from the traditional 
approach by putting greater emphasis on the output side and typically are demand driven, 
since they require communities to identify and propose programs as well as provide 
matching funds (Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz, and van Domelen 2002). 
The immediate welfare impact on poor households comes from higher wage 
earnings.  The welfare impact of public works (ignoring output benefits) is given by 
equation (7) above as 
  p w p θ θ α λ ) 1 ( − = , 
where θw is the share of wage payments in total program costs (i.e., wage plus non-wage 
costs) and θp is the share of total wage payments received by poor households.  The 
welfare gains per unit expenditure are therefore greater the higher the proportion of the 
labor employed comes from poor households, the greater the gap between project and 
market wages (or, more generally, forgone earnings), and the greater the share of wages 
in total program costs. 
However, there is typically a trade-off between the first two components:  the 
higher the project wage, the more attractive employment on public works for the 
nonpoor.  This effectively puts a practical limit on the resources that can be efficiently 
transferred to the poor under such schemes.  One way around this is to combine higher 
wages with, for example, an administrative targeting method to ration employment.  
Timing projects during periods of slack (e.g., during the rainy season) or placing them in 22 
the poorest areas may also enhance the welfare impact.  Of course, such a strategy may 
also have important implications for the type of output that can be sensibly produced by 
the project.  Higher wages may also have beneficial second-round welfare effects if they 
help reduce employer power in monopolistic labor markets.
19  Even in competitive labor 
markets, higher wages may be desirable from an equity perspective, although this comes 
at an efficiency cost if the output produced by the project, net of non-wage costs, is less 
valuable than forgone output. 
A useful starting point in the literature is the paper by Ravallion (1990b, 1991b).
20  
There he argues that, as of the late 1980s, there was surprisingly little quantitative 
evidence on the gains from targeting and the performance of incentive schemes for self-
targeting, with most attempts at doing so involving simulations using ad hoc assumptions.  
The paper refers to evidence on the targeting performance of two specific programs.  The 
first is the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in Maharashtra State, India, which was 
the single largest poverty alleviation scheme of any state in India in the late 1980s.  This 
scheme provided work on small-scale rural public works projects￿such as roads, 
irrigation facilities, and reforestation￿at wage rates on a par with prevailing agricultural 
wages.  Second is the Food for Work (FFW) program in Bangladesh, which provided 
employment for construction and maintenance of irrigation, drainage, and embankment 
projects. 
The evidence available from CGH indicates that the targeting performance of 
public works schemes is very variable.  Over the six programs for which they had 
evidence, the median performance was consistent with the poorest 30 percent receiving 
44 percent of wage transfers, with a range of 32￿80 percent over the worst- and best-
targeted programs.  The best-targeted program was the Trabajar program in Argentina, 
which put special emphasis on geographic targeting using an explicit formula for 
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wage rate differentials (e.g., between men and women, migrants and local workers, or across castes). For 
discussion see, for example, PEO 1980, Dandekar 1983, Binswanger et al. 1984, Hirway et al. 1990, and 
Subbarao 1989. 
20 See, also, Ravallion (1990a, 1991a, 1999) for further discussion. 23 
allocating resources based on the number of poor unemployed workers in each province 
and also on the extent of poverty.
21  In addition, low wages were paid to ensure that only 
the poorest households participated, and there was a specific objective of employing 
otherwise unemployed workers from poor families. 
However, what little evidence exists suggests that forgone earnings can constitute 
from 25 percent (for the EGS in India) to 50 percent (for Trabajar in Argentina) of the 
program wage, so that this substantially reduces the efficiency of the program in 
transferring income to the poor.
22  Adopting piecework schemes may be a way of 
addressing these problems if it enables participants to undertake other work.  Such 
flexibility is often thought to be more conducive to female participation because of the 
demand that housework puts on their time.  In addition, the non-wage costs accounted for 
around 30 percent of total government outlays on EGS and absorbed about 30 percent of 
the food aid used to finance FFW.  In fact, both programs have a rule that non-wage costs 
should account for at most 40 percent of variable costs. 
Based on the above numbers we can calculate the cost of transferring income to 
the poor under these schemes as the inverse of λp.  For every 100 rupees transferred to 
beneficiaries, the beneficiaries have a net gain, on average, of about 75 (i.e., net of 
forgone earnings) and nontransfer program costs are around 43 rupees (i.e., three-
sevenths of 100 rupees).  So, if only 80 percent of wage benefits accrue to the poor, these 
figures for forgone earnings and nontransfer costs suggest that it costs 143 rupees to get 
60 rupees to the poor (i.e., a ratio of nearly 2.4!).  Therefore, in the absence of substantial 
output benefits, these programs appear to be very expensive ways to transfer income to 
the poor. 
                                                 
21 The evaluation of the Trabajar program is probably one of the most thorough available.  For details, see 
Ravallion (2000), Jalan and Ravallion (2003), Galasso, Ravallion, and Salvia (2001), and Ravallion et al. 
(2001). 
22 See Ravallion and Datt (1995) for a modeling approach applied to the EGS, and Jalan and Ravallion 
(2003) for estimations for Trabajar, using matching techniques. 24 
Many of the issues discussed above are also addressed in von Braun (1995).  This 
volume summarizes the various outputs from research undertaken since the early 1980s, 
including FFW and EGS programs discussed above, but also public works for relief and 
development in Africa.
23  While emphasizing the important contribution of such 
programs to poverty alleviation, this work made clear that the effectiveness of such an 
approach depended on how well they were targeted and managed.  But since targeting 
effectiveness depended on setting low wages, this limited the potential impact on poverty.  
With higher wages, demand for employment exceeds jobs available so that it is important 
to incorporate additional screening based on characteristics that are highly correlated with 
poverty (e.g., geographic targeting).  Targeting on a work requirement also rules out 
transfers to those unable to work and demand-led projects tend to exclude the poorest 
communities that lack capacity. 
A more recent evaluation of 101 public works projects in the Western Cape 
Province of South Africa, which were introduced in the early 1990s to combat large-scale 
unemployment, reinforces the above insights (Haddad and Adato 2002).  Using a 
combination of actual data and simulations, they find large variability in performance as 
measured by the cost of transferring income to the poor, which is again consistent with 
performance depending sensitively on the detailed design and management issues.  Much 
of the bad targeting performance was due to bad geographic targeting.  Choosing labor-
intensive projects, preferably in poor areas, was also found to be crucial to performance 
when the output is not of major benefit to the poor.  In their qualitative evaluation, they 
also point out the difficulty of imposing low wage rates without community backing, 
since once the project has been set up, the threat of withdrawing labor is a powerful 
weapon (Adato and Haddad 2002).  This is especially the case when similar work gets 
higher wages in the private sector. 
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on Africa. 25 
There is also some evidence that in-kind transfers (e.g., food-for-work) may 
involve relatively high transaction costs (including illegal pilferage) and thus be less cost-
effective that cash transfers. In the context of famine relief, DrŁze and Sen (1989, 1991) 
argue that greater use of cash support (rather than the direct provision of food) should be 
considered, since the difficult logistics of transporting food (especially through public 
distribution systems) often appears to cause delays that can be very costly in terms of lost 
lives.  They also argue that previous experience during famine or near-famine situations 
has shown that, where the demand exists, private markets can be more efficient at 
transporting food to famine areas.  They also argue that ￿a plethora of recent studies has 
shown that the acquisition of cash (for subsequent conversion into food through the 
market) is now one of the most important survival strategies of vulnerable populations in 
famine prone countries￿ (DrŁze and Sen 1991, 19).  It is often argued that cash injections 
in the absence of a food injection will just lead to higher prices, thus benefiting private 
suppliers at the expense of famine-stricken households.  This is likely to be the case only 
when substantially large areas of a country are famine stricken, but past experience 
suggests that potential famine conditions often exist side by side with areas of large food 
market surpluses.  But the main point to be taken from this discussion is that if cash 
support can work more effectively in famine conditions, then such a strategy is even 
more likely to be more effective during normal conditions. 
A more comprehensive analysis would also need to adjust for any general 
equilibrium wage effects, which may be substantial.  The little evidence that exists 
suggests that these general equilibrium wage effects may be substantial, e.g., as much as 
a doubling of the direct transfer benefit (Ravallion 1990a).  But additional research is 
needed on the nature and magnitude of these general equilibrium effects, including the 
possibly adverse effect of the displacement of private transfers. 
Providing a guarantee of employment at a fixed wage has additional welfare 
impacts when it helps to stabilize the incomes and consumption of households that are 
unable to smooth consumption optimally over time￿the gains essentially come from 
providing income in periods when income is otherwise very low and thus the social value 26 
of income (β) very high.  Such a safety-net feature requires the program to expand and 
contract in response to anticipated and unanticipated income shocks experienced by 
households.  Experience with both EGS and FFW shows that employment does seem to 
increase substantially during the dry summer season and periods of widespread drought. 
The additional opportunity for smoothing provided by public works may prevent 
households engaging in distress land sales or in running down their asset base in bad 
times, e.g., by slaughtering cattle or pulling children out of school (Cain and Lieberman 
1983).  Since such benefits may be substantial, they should not be overlooked.  It has 
been argued that substantial improvements along these lines can be made in Bangladesh￿s 
FFW program, e.g., by choosing outputs that are sensible in periods of drought and 
generally increasing program flexibility (Hossain 1985; Hossain 1987).  The outputs 
(such as more effective irrigation or soil conservation systems) can also generate 
additional gains in terms of reducing fluctuations in incomes￿in addition to their impact 
in terms of higher average incomes.  Therefore, it may be that the comparative advantage 
of such programs lies in dealing with vulnerability and crisis situations rather than as 
approaches to dealing with structural poverty. 
On the output side, the potential for generating valuable output depends on good 
management and the selection of appropriate investments.  Avoiding the types of 
corruption often witnessed in these schemes requires providing management with 
appropriate incentives and capacity.
24  For relatively capital-intensive projects, efficient 
provision requires good management skills and sufficient demand for output, which 
suggests that location in remote rural areas is often inappropriate.  Therefore, for these 
programs, there tends to be an important trade-off between targeting and productive 
efficiency, although this tradeoff may be relaxed with greater intercommunity labor 
mobility.  When short-term famine relief is the objective, targeting performance is 
viewed as being relatively more important than long-term asset creation, although the 
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the EGS, while Ahmed et al. (1985) and Bandyopadhyay (1988) do so in the context of the FFW. 27 
presence of productive inefficiency implies that such programs are not likely to be cost-
effective in transferring income to the poor.  All of the above suggest that public works 
programs appropriate for alleviating poverty are likely to be those that use unskilled, 
labor-intensive technologies for producing outputs that are undersupplied by the market 
and located in poor areas (or made active during off-peak seasons or slumps). 
The choice (and location) of output may also be influenced by political 
considerations (von Braun 1995).  For example, it has been argued that the fact that they 
benefited from the project output played an important role in generating support from 
rich farmers for the Employment Guarantee scheme in Maharashtra state in India during 
the 1980s (Herring and Edwards 1983; Echeverri-Gent 1988).  In contrast, if high project 
wages put upward pressure on market wages for hired labor, this may reduce their 
support for such schemes.  This reinforces the need for better targeting both by choice of 
a lower project wage and the appropriate timing of projects so that they do not compete 
for labor in times of high demand.  As pointed out above, the desire for effective 
targeting and flexibility also has important implications for choice of output and mode of 
delivery.  For example, if there is a requirement to put contracts out to tender or to allow 
private-sector participation, implementation may be delayed. 
There is also evidence that local involvement in the selection and delivery of 
projects improves outcomes.  In Trabajar, where the emphasis is on creating assets valued 
by these poor communities, projects are proposed by local governments and NGOs, and 
these must cover the non-wage program costs.  The evaluation of the South Africa 
programs also supports this view.  Hoddinott et al. (2001) find that community 
participation is generally associated with improved project cost-effectiveness and better 
targeting.  Adato and Haddad (2002) suggest that enhancing the sense of community 
ownership may help counteract local forces for higher wages, as may additional design 
features, such as fixing the wage budget so that there is a visible trade-off between higher 
wages and employment levels.  The authors also highlight the importance for targeting 
outcomes of active information and coordination efforts when participation is demand-
driven, given the lower capacity of poorer communities in these areas.  Transparency and 28 
community participation are often strong forces working to achieve poverty alleviation 
objectives. 
Social funds have become a very popular vehicle for channeling development 
assistance to developing countries (Rawlings and Schady 2002).  These programs are 
typically characterized by substantial involvement of communities in the selection, 
design, and implementation of community-based development projects.  The first such 
program was implemented in Bolivia in 1987, and today almost all countries in Latin 
America, and many countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, have implemented 
similar programs.  The main differences with traditional public works programs are that 
social funds put stronger emphasis on the community asset produced by the program, are 
demand-driven, and sometimes require communities to provide matching funds.  The 
funds also tend to have more autonomy over resource allocation than other budget 
allocations in national governments, and their budgets are often substantial.  For example, 
the Nicaraguan social fund is the primary financier of health and education infrastructure 
in Nicaragua, with a budget more than 1 percent of the country￿s GDP.  Between 1991 
and 1998, it carried out 40 percent of all public investments in social infrastructure 
(Pradhan and Rawlings 2002). 
The programs typically involve investments in community infrastructure such as 
schools, health facilities, sewage, waste, and water.  In order to improve access by poor 
communities, these funds will often provide institutional support to develop the capacity 
to design and implement such programs.  In addition, communities must usually select 
from a menu of projects constructed by the fund.  The World Bank has recently 
undertaken impact analyses of a number of social fund programs (Rawlings, Sherburne-
Benz, and van Domelen 2002).
25  The evaluations indicate that these programs have 
improved the quality of infrastructure in participating communities and increased 
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utilization of the services provided.  They also found that the programs have sometimes 
had a measurable impact on human capital outcomes. 
The evidence on targeting performance is more mixed.  Of the eight such 
programs included in CGH, the median targeting performance was consistent with the 
poorest 30 percent of households receiving approximately 36 percent of the budget.  This 
suggests that the emphasis on producing quality investments may have a trade-off in 
terms of the funds￿ ability to reach the poorest communities, which may possess much 
lower capacity to coordinate their resources to design, bid for, and implement such 
programs.  In other words, there may be an important trade-off between equity and 
efficiency (or redistribution and cost-effectiveness). 
One expects such trade-offs to depend on the complexity of the project.  For 
example, in their evaluation of the Nicaraguan social fund, Pradhan and Rawlings (2002) 
found that whereas investments in latrines, schools, and health posts had progressive 
benefit incidence, investments in water systems had neutral incidence, and those in 
sewerage had regressive benefit incidence. The evidence also indicates that with 
education and health investments, the fund was substantially better at targeting the poor 
(48 percent of the population) as opposed to the extremely poor (17 percent of the 
population).  Also, in both Nicaragua and Peru (Paxson and Schady 2002), even though 
the fund was relatively successful at targeting extremely poor municipalities through 
first-stage geographic targeting of the budget, it was much less effective at reaching the 
poorest households within these communities.  Therefore, social funds appear to be a 
good approach to building the community asset base for poor (but not extremely poor) 
households.  Their emphasis on generating quality investments also suggests that they are 
relatively less attractive as an approach to addressing short-term fluctuations in incomes. 
It is widely accepted that there is an urgent need for governments and the 
development community to invest in well-designed evaluations of development projects.  
However, a recent study by Subbarao et al. (1999) found that only 5.4 percent of all 
World Bank projects in fiscal year 1998 included elements necessary for a solid impact 
evaluation (e.g., outcome indicators, baseline data, and a comparison group).  The 30 
evaluations of these funds also shows what can be achieved with a structured approach to 
program evaluation; the results provide important information for policymakers and 
donors with regard to the effectiveness of development assistance. Similar evaluations 
need to be applied more widely in developing countries.
26 
5.  Human Capital Subsidies 
In a large part due to the shortcomings identified regarding existing approaches to 
social safety nets, developing countries and donors have recently experimented with a 
relatively new approach to social safety nets, which (like public works above) combines 
their traditional ￿preventive￿ roles with a ￿promotional￿ role.  These programs give cash 
transfers to households conditional on households investing in human capital through 
regular attendance at nutrition and hygiene sessions, health clinics for preventive health 
care, and school.
27  Investing in the nutritional, health, and education status of children is 
seen as playing a key role in breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty and 
destitution.  In this sense, such programs are particularly focused on the ￿structurally 
poor￿ (as opposed to just vulnerable), whose poverty persists over time. 
While these programs exist in various forms in a number of countries, they have 
recently become increasingly popular in Latin America.  Programs exist or are in the 
planning stages in Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Turkey.  The growing interest in such programs reflects the fact that an 
unusually rigorous evaluation of Mexico￿s program (Programa Nacional de Educaci￿n, 
Salud y Alimentaci￿n) (PROGRESA) has shown it to be very effective (Skoufias 2001).  
But it is also the case that the Inter-American Development Bank has played a key role in 
promoting such an evaluation culture in support of these programs.  Undoubtedly, 
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development institutes and donors in other regions of the developing world can play a 
similar role. 
These programs have a number of features that are crucial to achieving their 
objectives.  First, these programs are designed, coordinated, and often implemented by 
dedicated central government program teams, this being partly motivated by a desire to 
avoid unnecessary administrative and bureaucratic costs as well as the potential for 
corruption.  Cash transfers are sent directly to participating households from the central 
budget. 
Second, the program designs include the explicit use of a combination of targeting 
mechanisms, including geographic, categorical, and proxy means targeting methods.  
Although it is sometimes argued that fine targeting can result in loss of political support 
from the excluded middle classes, the fact that the benefits go only to those who are 
needy is often used to generate domestic political support as well as support from the 
international development community. 
Third, the fact that transfers are conditioned on households investing in their own 
future has been used to argue that the programs are a hand up rather than a handout, and 
they signal a transition from a pure social assistance approach to safety nets to one of 
social development.  This approach thus combines a recognition of the ￿rights￿ of the 
poor with them having ￿responsibilities￿ for achieving these rights. 
Fourth, the programs help integrate a number of previous duplicative and 
uncoordinated programs under one umbrella.  In this sense, many of the programs are not 
entirely new interventions but rather a more coordinated approach to existing programs.  
Fifth, most of the programs involve ￿community promoters,￿ beneficiaries who play a 
key role in providing information to beneficiaries regarding their rights and 
responsibilities and providing feedback to program officials on issues arising among 
beneficiaries and service providers. 
Finally, these programs have typically included an evaluation component built in 
from the early stages of the program cycle.  This has been used both domestically and 
internationally to generate political support. 32 
The evaluations have shown that these programs have had substantial impacts 
among the poorest populations.  For example, on the whole, the targeting performance for 
these programs has been very impressive, with most of them appearing in the top third of 
programs reviewed by CGH, with the poorest 40 percent of the population receiving over 
70 percent of program transfers.  Similarly, the available evidence also points to 
substantial human capital impacts.  For example, PROGRESA in Mexico increased 
enrollments in secondary school from 67 percent to 75 percent for girls and from 73 
percent to 78 percent for boys (Schultz 2000).  The results for the Red de Protecci￿n 
Social (RPS) program in Nicaragua are even more impressive, with enrollment rates in 
primary school increasing from 69 to 91 percent for both boys and girls (Maluccio 2003).  
In Bangladesh, Food for Education (FFE) increased primary school enrollment rates by 
9￿17 percentage points (Ravallion and Wodon 2000; Ahmed and del Ninno 2001).  These 
programs have also had substantial impacts in other dimensions, such as income poverty, 
child labor, nutrition, and health.
28 
Are these programs transferable to other countries?  The fact that the programs 
have been implemented successfully in countries like Bangladesh and Nicaragua suggest 
that they, at least, have potential.  These programs are definitely easier to implement in 
circumstances where there is already widespread access.  Empirical evidence has 
consistently shown that in spite of improved access to education and health services, poor 
households often have substantially lower utilization rates reflecting the high opportunity 
costs of access (e.g., forgone earnings, travel costs, and the cost of uniforms and 
education materials).  Therefore, supply-side interventions in isolation are often found 
not to be very effective at enticing poor households to access these services.  
Conditioning targeted cash transfers on accessing these facilities, which effectively 
transforms pure transfers into human capital subsidies, is an attractive policy response to 
this problem in these circumstances. 
                                                 
28 See Skoufias (2001), IFPRI (2002), Maluccio (2003), and Coady (2003) for reviews of the evidence. 33 
For example, evidence for Mexico, where initial supply-side conditions are 
relatively favorable, suggests that demand-side subsidies were around 10 times more 
cost-effective at increasing access compared to the school-building program that 
simultaneously took place (Coady and Parker 2002).  In terms of transfers to households, 
it also cost less than 10 pesos in administrative costs for every peso transferred to 
households.  This compares very favorably to other Mexican programs, such as the 
LICONSA (subsidized milk) and TORTIVALES (subsidized tortilla) programs, which 
cost 40 and 14 pesos per 100 pesos transferred to beneficiaries (Grosh 1994), 
respectively. 
The evaluation of the RPS finds that administrative costs have accounted for 
about 30 percent for the pilot program.  However, this large share partly reflects the fact 
that the program is still not mature, and fixed costs are thus spread over a smaller transfer 
base.  For example, administrative costs account for only 20 percent of total costs in the 
final year of the program.  Based on this number, it costs the government less than 1.2 
cordobas for every cordoba transferred to households and service providers.  In addition, 
unlike in PROGRESA, the RPS includes a supply side, and setting up this component has 
absorbed a substantial amount of resources and, as we saw above, the resulting human 
capital impacts have been immense. 
However, where there are important supply-side bottlenecks (i.e., where access to 
a basic quality of service is not widely available), these programs are more complex and 
resource-intensive to implement.  Access, although a necessary condition for capital 
accumulation, is itself insufficient.  Human capital accumulation requires that such access 
be complemented with quality services.  For this reason, many of the programs include a 
supply-side component to reinforce the impact of demand-side subsidies.  While such a 
program was very successfully implemented in Nicaragua, the operational experience 
with a similar program in Honduras (Programa de Asignaci￿n Familiar) (PRAF) 
suggests that the complexity of combined demand- and supply-side initiatives may be too 
much for many poor countries with limited implementation capacity.  One approach 
would be to stagger the two dimensions, focusing first on getting the supply side into 34 
operation before introducing household transfers.  No doubt the ongoing evaluations of 
these experiences will continue to add to our knowledge regarding the appropriate design 
for these programs in different socioeconomic circumstances. 
6.  Lessons for Policy 
This paper has reviewed evidence on the relative performance of various program 
components of social safety nets commonly found in developing countries, with a view to 
identifying factors that influence their performance and associated lessons for policy.  
Empirical evidence clearly shows that universal food subsidies are not very effective 
ways of transferring resources to the poor.  This reflects the fact that they are very rarely 
progressive and are often associated with large consumption and production efficiency 
costs.  For this reason, universal food subsidies are often viewed as stopgap policies until 
more cost-effective transfer instruments can be developed. 
Although targeted subsidized food subsidies (e.g., through ration shops) can 
greatly increase their benefit incidence and reduce the associated inefficiencies, in 
practice their performance has not always been great, reflecting both high leakages to the 
nonpoor, high costs associated with distributing food, and corruption.  Empirical 
evidence highlights the high costs often associated with such transfers.  Achieving good 
performance requires that adequate resources need to be devoted to the separate 
administrative tasks of screening, delivery, and monitoring.  In addition, if the transport 
costs associated with distributing food cannot be reduced substantially, then it may be 
that use of cash is a more attractive option.  But it is also widely accepted that cost-
effective targeted schemes are available and can work.  However, social and political 
factors need to be taken into account when managing the reform process. 
Although well-designed and well-implemented public works programs appear to 
have great potential for targeting poor households, they also appear to be a relatively 
costly way of dealing with current poverty.  The existence of high non-wage costs and 
forgone earnings means that the cost per unit (net) income transferred to poor households 35 
is relatively high.  But certain design features can ensure that such costs are substantially 
reduced, including the use of low wages, good geographic targeting, and selection of 
labor-intensive projects. 
On the asset creation side, since there is likely to be a trade-off with the objective 
of reducing current poverty, it is important that when asset creation is seen as a crucial 
objective that these assets actually get created and benefit poor communities.  In this 
respect, there is some evidence that promoting community involvement in selecting, 
designing, and implementing projects can lead to substantial improvements in these 
areas.  However, there is also some evidence consistent with community involvement 
only working well when there are good governance structures and active participation of 
civil society in these structures.  The design of social funds seems attractive from these 
perspectives. 
Public works are particularly effective at addressing the issue of vulnerability to 
poverty (as opposed to structural poverty) and in crisis situations.  This, of course, 
requires that such programs be flexible at expanding and contracting in response to 
economic conditions and this, in turn, may have important implications for the outputs 
that can be sensibly produced.  Thus, the choice of labor-intensive projects requiring low 
management skills and paying relatively low wages would appear to be a precondition for 
public works to be effective at addressing both current poverty and vulnerability.  Their 
combined emphasis on short- and long-term poverty alleviation, through wages and 
infrastructure development, may also make such programs particularly appealing in post-
conflict situations.  But experience with social funds suggests that the greater the 
emphasis on generating quality investments, the larger the trade-off in terms of reaching 
the extreme poor. 
However, rigorous evaluations are only available for India and Argentina.  Thus, 
there is an obvious need for further evaluations similar to those recently carried out for 
social funds, especially of programs designed to avoid some of the shortcomings of 
existing programs.  Important research issues for public works programs are the nature 
and magnitude of any general equilibrium effects, the potential for substantially 36 
decreasing forgone incomes, the role of good management and project selection in 
decreasing non-wage costs, and the trade-offs between the longer-term output and 
shorter-term income objectives. 
A recent program innovation in developing countries, particularly Latin America, 
is targeted human capital subsidies (i.e., transfers conditioned on households investing in 
their children￿s nutrition, health, and education status).  These are a promising approach 
to addressing structural poverty and the conditioning of transfers on households 
accumulating human capital adds a ￿promotional￿ dimension to the traditional 
￿prevention￿ role of social safety nets.  Invariably, household-level data in many 
developing countries show that the poorest households are not only poor in terms of 
income and consumption levels, but also in terms of human capital (i.e., nutrition, health, 
and education) as well.  These new human capital programs are attractive because they 
can help address many of the shortcomings of existing social safety nets:  they use a 
combination of targeting methods to ensure the benefits reach the poor; they are often 
centrally designed and implemented, thus avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy and 
opportunities for corruption; they integrate many duplicative programs under one 
umbrella program; and they can help to break the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty through improved human capital status of children in poor households. 
The fact that these human capital programs have been successful in some poor 
countries suggests that they have potential for being successful elsewhere.  However, to 
be successful, the design of these programs will need to reflect local conditions including, 
the quality of education and health care, the existing level of access to these services by 
poor households, the capacity to implement and monitor such programs, and the potential 
role for community actors.  Other economic policies must also be conducive to 
generating broad-based growth capable of absorbing this more skilled labor force 
productively.  Although by themselves these programs are not a panacea for all 
development problems, their proven performance justifies serious consideration of such 
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